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  From 1972 to 2007, six million hectares 
of land (half of the country’s farmland) 
was redistributed to three million poor 
households (two-fifths of the country’s 
agricultural population). Fifty-three per 
cent of the total accomplishment in land 
redistribution during this 35-year period 
was acheived within six years from 1992 
to 1998. Of course the period of reform 
was not without its problems, and many 
issues remained unaddressed, but the 
speed of reform did mark a significant 
departure from previous or subsequent 
periods. This was also unusual as at that 
time land reform was absent from the 
official agendas of most other 
governments and international 
development institutions.
 
  Political opportunities 
By the early 1980s a revolutionary 
peasants’ protest movement had spread 
across the country. It succeeded in 
putting agrarian reform on the national 
agenda, and contributed to the fall of 
the Marcos regime. The social 
movement gained new liberal rights 
under Aquino’s government (1986 to 
1992), but the land reform agenda was 
weakened partly by the left’s half-
hearted electoral participation in the 
subsequent election, and a resurgence 
of the landed elite. A compromise land 
reform bill was passed called the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program (CARP). Although widely 
derided as weak by the left, the land 
reform law nevertheless became the 
basis for the accelerated period of land 
redistribution during Ramos’s 
subsequent presidency (1992 to 1998). 
Ramos was not known as a reformer, 
but shifting political alignments and a 
divided elite meant he entered office 
with a very weak electoral mandate. To 
broaden his political base Ramos 
recruited civil society activists into 
important positions in the bureaucracy.  
Simultaneously, a new autonomous 
broad and progressive peasant 
movement emerged, and the influence 
of the revolutionary Communist left 
diminished. 
  The new progressive peasant 
movements and the newly-appointed 
state reformers became the key drivers 
of change during this period. Within the 
government, a significant actor was 
Ernesto Garilao, the former head of one 
of the country’s largest mainstream 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs). He was appointed by Ramos as 
the new secretary for the Department 
of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and used his 
appointment to give several civil society 
activists senior positions in the DAR, 
creating an unprecedented opportunity 
for reform. The progressive peasant 
movements took advantage of these 
political openings to create a critical 
alliance with the state reformers and 
accelerate land distribution.  
  State reformers 
The presence of reform-minded officials 
at the top of the DAR bureaucracy 
provided important backing to junior 
officials to carry out expropriations, and 
to neutralise or isolate anti-reform 
officials. Garilao also deliberately 
exposed officials to militant autonomous 
peasant groups and NGOs, in order to 
help convert them to a reformist 
orientation. This was an important 
contrast to previous administrations 
during which lower ranking land reform 
officials had often been easily 
immobilised by anti-reform influences 
and manipulation by landlords. Having
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  high-ranking pro-land reform officials also 
allowed DAR to better fight its corner with 
Congress, the judiciary and other stage 
agencies. Also, neither Ramos nor his wife 
came from a big landowning family, thereby 
widening the space for reform. Significantly, 
Garilao sought to engage the peasant 
movement and their allies in helping 
implement the CARP.  Previous governments 
had tended to work with farmers associations 
they could control, in exchange for limited 
land reform concessions as a means of 
containing rural unrest.  But Garilao saw the 
peasant movements as ‘autonomous partners 
with whom we intersect in areas where there 
are common agreements, and seek 
resolutions in areas of difference.’ He also 
used the sympathy and support of the peasant 
movement to strengthen his leverage within 
the broader state bureaucracy.
  Another important initiative was Garilao’s 
establishment of the Agrarian Reform 
Community (ARC) development programme 
in 1993. This programme aimed to make the 
land holdings productive and viable. Although 
not without its failings, it reinvigorated donor 
interest in CARP which in turn made anti-
reformists less willing to attack CARP for fear 
of antagonising them. It also provided 
empirical evidence that agrarian reform could 
actually work, again helping shield CARP from 
attack.
  The rural social movement 
In contrast to the revolutionary left which had 
rejected the CARP and demanded 
‘confiscatory’ land reform, the progressive 
peasant movements called for its 
implementation. This change in framing 
provided a legitimate legal framework which 
was difficult for opponents to attack. 
Subsequently, land reform began to be 
discussed in terms of a broader anti-poverty 
framework which also made it hard for anti-
reformists to undermine and attracted donors 
as allies.
  The peasant movements developed a 
groundbreaking approach called the ‘bibingka’ 
strategy (‘Bibingka’ is a rice cake-cooked  from 
below and above). Used in this context it 
refers to the mutually reinforcing interaction 
between militant mobilisations of peasant 
movements ‘from below’ and reformist 
initiatives ‘from above’ by state reformers. The 
strategy marked a significant departure from 
the oppositional strategies of the 
revolutionary communist left and the 
traditional ‘patron-client’ based strategies of 
the conservative peasant organisations. The 
revolutionary left feared that engagement 
with the state would lead to co-option, but 
the positive outcomes of the period indicated 
that the ‘bibingka’ strategy delivered real 
change. A concrete example of the alliance 
was the creation of  NGO-peasant-DAR joint 
campaigns, called Provincial Campaigns for 
Agrarian Reform and Rural Development 
(ProCARRD). 
  Insights 
The research reveals how an alliance between 
civil society organisations and state reformers, 
resulted in positive and significant gains for 
poor people on a contentious issue. Co-option 
was avoided because of the critical mass of 
reformers within government, and the 
independence of the peasant movements 
who were able to back their demands with 
militant mobilisation.  
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